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Abstract
After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign
creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to
Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998
triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of
Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had
issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base.
The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was
closed; the existing limited deposit insurance scheme covered only small savers, after a
delay, and with haircuts reflecting the depreciation of the sucre. A flight to quality followed,
as depositors shifted from sucre deposits to US dollar deposits. On December 1, 1998, the
Ecuadorian government created the Deposit Guarantee Agency (Agencia de Garantía de
Depósitos, or AGD) to restore stability in bank liabilities. The AGD guaranteed trade credit
lines and all bank deposits. It also resolved banks, mainly through purchase and assumption
transactions. The government also imposed a 1% tax on all financial transactions to support
public finances; the tax, imposed amidst a liquidity crunch, accelerated the collapse of
several financial institutions, including Ecuador’s largest bank. During the blanket deposit
guarantee, the government announced a surprise bank holiday, partial deposit freeze, and
uncertain schedule for the partial deposit freeze lift. The trade credit line guarantee ended
as of March 2000. The AGD phased out blanket deposit coverage between 2001 and 2004.
The AGD closed after 11 years on December 31, 2009, replaced by the Deposit Security
Corporation (Corporación del Seguro de Depósitos, or COSEDE). COSEDE covers depositors
up to USD 31,000.
Keywords: Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos, bank runs, blanket guarantee, Ecuador,
liquidity

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering blanket guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
In Ecuador, late 20th century financial
liberalization, foreign capital inflows, and lax
prudential regulation allowed financial
intermediaries to engage in risky lending,
which created a boom-and-bust cycle during
the 1990s (Jácome H. 2004; Martinez 2006).
Credit climbed in real terms by 40% in 1993
and 50% in 1994. A series of exogenous
shocks in 1995 prompted a bust in Ecuador:
a banking crisis in Mexico, border conflicts,
energy crises, natural disasters, and
governance problems, among other issues
(Hidalgo Loffredo, Yturralde Farah, and
Maluk Salem 1999; Jácome H. 2004). To stem
capital outflows, the Central Bank of Ecuador
(Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE)
increased open market operations to
contract Ecuador’s money base, stabilize the
exchange rate, and temper inflation.
However, the increase in BCE’s interest rate
led financial intermediaries with maturity
mismatch problems into severe liquidity
issues. Though the BCE provided banks with
liquidity support at the time, the banking
system remained fragile and vulnerable to
future external shocks (Jácome H. 2004;
Martinez 2006).

Key Terms
Purpose: In terms of trade lines, to “persuade
lenders to restore credit lines to pre-September
1998 levels” and to stem the banking crisis
(Republic of Ecuador 2000b, 60). In terms of
deposits, to “restore stability in bank liabilities” and
prevent deposit runs (Jácome H. 2004, 19, 29)
Launch Date(s)

December 1, 1998, for trade
lines and deposits

End Date(s)

March 2000 for trade
financing; March 2004 for
deposits

Eligible
Institutions

For trade lines:
All lenders
For deposits:
Banks, finance companies,
savings and loan
cooperatives, leasing
companies, credit card
issuers, brokerage houses,
insurance companies

Eligible Accounts

Trade financing; deposits
with certain restrictions

Fees

65 bps per year of
institutions’ average deposit
balances; USD 13 million
collected

Another series of shocks hit the Ecuadorian
Coverage
As of August 2000:
economy and impaired bank assets in 1997–
1998, including El Niño floods that destroyed
USD 2.6 billion in total
agricultural areas, the Russian financial
liabilities
crisis, the Brazilian financial crisis, and
USD 800 million–USD 850
plummeting oil prices (EIU 2004; Jácome H.
million in deposits
2004; Republic of Ecuador 2000a; Republic
Unclear
of Ecuador 2000b). Foreign creditors Outcomes
reassessed their emerging-market risk and Notable Features
Bank holiday and deposit
freeze; 1% tax on all financial
reduced international interbank and trade
transactions
lines by USD 300 million in the fourth
quarter of 1998 (see Figure 1) (de la Torre,
García-Saltos, and Mascaró 2001; IMF 2000b; Jácome H. 2004). The USD 300 million
reduction in external trade lines totaled 17% of all credit lines and 20% of the CBE’s
international reserves at the time (Jácome H. 2004). The weakest banks increased distressed
borrowing in response to the liquidity crunch (de la Torre, García-Saltos, and Mascaró 2001).
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The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 prompted contagion and deposit
runs at other banks, including two of the three largest banks in Ecuador (de la Torre, GarcíaSaltos, and Mascaró 2001; Jácome H. 2004). Banks sought assistance from the BCE, which
responded by issuing emergency loans to 11 financial institutions by the end of September
1998 (Jácome H. 2004).
The BCE also administered a limited deposit insurance scheme, up to approximately USD
8,000 per depositor for domestic and foreign currency deposits—depending on the real
exchange rate, since coverage was tied to an inflation-indexed unit. However, the existing
limited deposit insurance scheme could not sufficiently cover payouts when Banco de
Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank in terms of assets, was closed. Small Banco de Prestamos
savers did receive payouts, but only after several weeks and after the value of payouts had
eroded due to inflation and the depreciation of the Ecuadorian sucre (ECS). Some large
creditors did not recover payouts even after several years (EIU 2004; Jácome H. 2004). There
followed a flight to quality in the autumn of 1998, as sucre deposits shifted to US dollar
deposits (Jácome H. 2004).
Figure 1: External Credit Lines of the Ecuadorian Banking System (USD millions)
(1/98 = Jan. 1998)

Source: IMF 2000b.

On December 1, 1998, the Ecuadorian government created the Deposit Guarantee Agency
(Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos, or AGD) to restore stability in bank liabilities (El
Telégrafo 2014; Jácome H. 2004; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). The government also imposed
a 1% tax on all financial transactions—debits and credits—which effectively accelerated the
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financial collapse of various banks, including the largest bank in the system measured by
deposits, Banco del Progreso (EIU 2004; Jácome H. 2004). Demand deposits in the banking
system fell by 17% in January 1999 (Jácome H. 2004).
In November 1999, Congress passed another law that allowed the AGD to cover deposit
guarantees for Banco de Prestamos (Dow Jones 1998; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). This bank
was not previously eligible for the blanket guarantee because its liquidation began before
the AGD’s creation; depositors had already received USD 2,000 under the preceding limited
deposit insurance scheme (IMF 2000b; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). The fiscal cost of Banco
de Prestamos’ inclusion in the blanket guarantee was USD 200 million (IMF 2000b).
On March 8, 1999, then–Bank Superintendent Jorge Egas declared a surprise bank holiday to
“preserve the stability of bank reserves, limit the withdrawals that could [affect] the
domestic financial system, and avoid pressure on the currency and the continued rise in
prices” (AP 1999). The bank holiday lasted from March 8 through March 12, 1999 (IMF
2000a).
On March 11, 1999, the president and finance minister announced a one-year partial freeze
on deposits, which prompted depositors to withdraw ECS 1.7 billion (USD 147,288)3
according to the BCE (see Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a Package) (WSJ 1999).
On September 30, 1999, Ecuador became the first country to ever default on its Brady bonds4
after it failed to make a USD 98 million interest payment. Ecuador owed USD 6 billion to
bondholders in total (Crenson 1999).
Sixteen financial institutions, comprising 65% of Ecuador’s onshore assets, were intervened
or closed by the AGD by the beginning of January 2000 (IMF 2000b).
On January 9, 2000, Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its official currency (Republic of
Ecuador 2000b). The transition from sucres to US dollars occurred between April and
September 2000 (see Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a Package) (EIU 2004).
On April 19, 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a one-year standby
arrangement with Ecuador for special drawing right (SDR) 226.7 million (USD 170 million)5
(IMF 2000a; Republic of Ecuador 2000a; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). This allowed Ecuador
to receive additional funding from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank,
and the Andean Development Corporation. Disbursements through June 30, 2000, exceeded
USD 193.3 million, and commitments through December 31, 2000, exceeded USD 719 million
(Republic of Ecuador 2000b).

USD 1 = ECS 11,542 on March 11, 1999, according to Bloomberg.
bonds are sovereign debt securities with long-term maturities, denominated in US dollars and partially
backed by US Treasury bonds. Starting in 1989, emerging-market countries began to issue Brady bonds to
restructure their debt following the Latin American debt crisis (Crenson 1999; Fed 1998).
5 USD 1 = SDR 0.75 on April 19, 2000, according to the IMF.
3

4 Brady
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More than 90% of depositors received their full deposits back by mid-2000, according to the
Economist Intelligence Unit (2004). However, some large depositors with deposits of more
than USD 10,000 had still not received payouts (EIU 2004).
The AGD phased out blanket deposit coverage between 2001 and 2004 (see Key Design
Decision No. 13, Duration) (Republic of Ecuador 2000b; Republic of Ecuador 2000).
On December 10, 2008, the Ecuadorian Transitional Congress passed the Law of Financial
Security, which outlined the replacement of the AGD by a new body: the Deposit Security
Corporation (Corporación del Seguro de Depósitos, or COSEDE). The law gave a 12-month
transition period plus a potential six-month grace period after the AGD’s closure (EIU 2009;
Global Insight Daily Analysis 2008). The AGD transferred USD 133 million to COSEDE’s new
Deposit Insurance Fund in January 2009 (COSEDE 2013).
The AGD closed after 11 years on December 31, 2009 (El Comercio 2009). Today, the
COSEDE manages deposit insurance in Ecuador and covers up to USD 31,000 per depositor
(COSEDE n.d.; COSEDE Law n.d.; COSEDE 2013).
Summary Evaluation
The BCE president, Luis Jácome, and board of directors resigned en masse on March 12,
1999, to protest the freezing of bank deposits by the president and Ministry of Finance
(Alvaro and Tedesco 1999). In an IMF working paper, Jácome says that the guarantee was
“seemingly a desperate decision to contain mounting bank deposit withdrawals” (2004, 25).
In Jácome’s view, in guaranteeing deposits and trade lines, the government printed a
“massive” amount of money, thus contributing to monetary instability and moral hazard. He
also criticizes the government’s execution, communication, and other policies around the
guarantee. In Jácome’s view, the lagged payouts imposed losses on depositors, prompting
further contagion and deposit runs; the bank holiday and deposit freeze communicated the
message that all banks were impaired, promoting a systemic lack of confidence; and the
“devastating” tax on financial transactions accelerated financial institutions’ collapse during
the midst of a liquidity crunch (Jácome H. 2004).
Three academics—Denisse S. Hidalgo Loffredo, Omar R. Yturralde Farah, and Omar Maluk
Salem—have similarly criticized the AGD’s administration and expertise. They argue that
lagged deposit insurance payments were poor practices amidst domestic currency
depreciation (Hidalgo Loffredo, Yturralde Farah, and Maluk Salem 1999).
According to a publication from the World Bank, Ecuador’s guarantees lacked credibility,
thereby undermining their effectiveness. The argument asserts that deposit guarantees were
more credible at smaller institutions, since there was less confidence that the government
could keep large banks open and fully honor all deposits (Beckerman and Solimano 2002).
For a paper published in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, Gabriel X. Martinez
interviewed bankers, businesspeople, regulators, economics analysts, and authorities about
Ecuador’s financial crisis. Some of Martinez’s interviewees say that regulators had conflicts
of interest during the crisis “because of their connections with and dependence on the
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banking and political systems” (Martinez 2006, 573). After Ecuador’s financial liberalization,
“nearly all” banking superintendents were well connected with the private sector (Martinez
2006).
An IMF report concludes that there was “little credibility in the deposit guarantee” given
Ecuador’s weak fiscal position and the insolvency of several large banks (IMF 2000b, 26).
The IMF also characterizes Ecuador’s bank restructuring implementation as “uneven” with
“strong” conflict of interest problems between the government and private sector (IMF
2000b, 27). The government also made political decisions that increased the costs to the
government, the IMF finds. One example of a political decision that the IMF mentions is the
bailout of Solbanco’s shareholders in July 1999. Solbanco’s main depositor, a public
employees’ pension fund, had converted part of its deposits into equity to help Solbanco
build capital in 1998; when the bank’s problems worsened in 1999, the government reversed
that conversion, turning the new shares into insured deposits. The IMF estimates that
decision cost USD 75 million (IMF 2000b).
The IMF says that the financial transactions tax exacerbated Ecuador’s liquidity crunch. In
the same report, the IMF estimates the fiscal cost of Ecuador’s crisis response, concluding
that poor policy choices added “substantially” to this cost (see Figure 2) (IMF 2000b).
Figure 2: Crisis Fiscal Cost (as of June 2000)
Type

Cost

% of GDP

Bonds issued on behalf of the AGD

USD 1.4 billion

10.7%

Guaranteed deposits (not covered by bonds)

USD 1.0 billion

7.6%

Nonperforming trade credit lines of AGD banks

USD 0.2 billion

1.7%

Total

USD 2.6 billion

20.0%

Source: IMF 2000b.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The government created the AGD to prevent runs by depositors and
other creditors.
Depositors ran on Ecuadorian banks after the small bank Solbanco closed in April 1998; runs
and closures continued throughout 1998 (de la Torre, García-Saltos, and Mascaró 2001;
Jácome H. 2004). The government created the AGD to “restore stability in bank liabilities”
and prevent deposit runs, according to then–BCE President Luis Jácome in a retrospective
IMF working paper (2004, 19, 29).
A series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy and impaired bank assets in 1997–
1998, including El Niño floods that destroyed agricultural areas, the Russian financial crisis,
the Brazilian financial crisis, and plummeting oil prices (EIU 2004; Jácome H. 2004; Republic
of Ecuador 2000a; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). Foreign creditors reassessed their emergingmarket risk and reduced international interbank and trade lines by USD 300 million in the
fourth quarter of 1998 (IMF 2000b; de la Torre, García-Saltos, and Mascaró 2001). The USD
300 million reduction in external trade lines totaled 17% of all credit lines and 20% of the
CBE’s international reserves at the time (Jácome H. 2004). A bond prospectus on behalf of
Ecuador in August 2000 said that “the Government intend[ed] to persuade lenders to restore
credit lines to pre-September 1998 levels” with the trade line guarantee (Republic of
Ecuador 2000b, 60). The government stated that failure to restore credit lines to Ecuadorian
banks would further aggravate the banking crisis (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
2. Part of a Package: The government imposed (a) a bank holiday and partial deposit
freeze to stem runs, (b) a tax on all financial transactions to support public
finances, and (c) dollarization to stabilize the economy.
Bank Holiday and Deposit Freeze
On March 8, 1999, then–Bank Superintendent Jorge Egas declared a surprise bank holiday to
“preserve the stability of bank reserves, limit the withdrawals that could [affect] the
domestic financial system, and avoid pressure on the currency and the continued rise in
prices” (AP 1999). The bank holiday lasted from March 8 through March 12, 1999 (IMF
2000a; Republic of Ecuador 2000a).
On March 11, 1999, the president and finance minister announced a partial freeze6 on
deposits following the bank holiday to protect the system against speculative attacks and
6 In light

of the partial freeze, depositors could request negotiable claims on their respective banks (certificates
of reprogrammed deposits; certificados de depósito reprogrammable, or CDRs) with a discount that differed
according to market perception about respective banks’ strength. Depositors could use CDRs to buy durable
consumer goods and real estate (Jácome H. 2004). A government decree in November 1999 forced banks to
accept CDRs as payments of credits at face value, up to the amount of credit lines granted to each bank by the
National Financial Corporation (Corporación Financiera Nacional, or CFN). The CFN was a second-tier
development bank. Banks could use CDRs to cancel CFN lines. According to the IMF, this November 1999 decree
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runs (Alvaro and Tedesco 1999; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). Sources differ on the exact
details of the freeze.7 After the announcement, depositors further withdrew ECS 1.7 billion,
according to the BCE (WSJ 1999).
In testimony before the Fiscal Committee in Congress on March 30, 1999, former BCE
President Jácome said:
The bank holiday and the freeze on deposits have caused high economic and social
costs and have tended to generate distrust in the country’s banking system, which in
turn prompted bank withdrawals of about ECS 1.7 billion from citizens and
businesses. (Dow Jones 1999b)
By April 1999, the government unfroze the deposits of those over 65 years old, those with a
terminal illness, foreign depositors, and accounts belonging to nongovernmental
organizations and public institutions (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
The Constitutional Tribunal8 declared account freezes unconstitutional in December 1999.
Though the government issued a resolution that scheduled the unfreezing of accounts, it
appears that this was delayed and revised for several months. One issue was whether to pay
guaranteed deposits in (1) a combination of cash and bonds or (2) cash only (Republic of
Ecuador 2000b). The AGD paid deposit guarantees in cash only at first and with additional
bonds after dollarization (see Key Design Decision No. 11, Process for Exercising Guarantee).
Frozen accounts comprised 33.3% of total deposits in the financial system as of June 30,
1999. The freeze significantly contracted liquidity and virtually halted all financial activity
(Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
Financial Transaction Tax
The legislation establishing the AGD also eliminated the income tax (El Telégrafo 2014).
However, the Law for Economic Transformation imposed a 1% tax on all financial
transactions—debits and credits—to substitute the income tax and support public finances
(Jácome H. 2004; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). The Economist Intelligence Unit and Jácome
argue that this tax effectively accelerated the financial collapse of various banks, including
the largest bank in the system measured by deposits, Banco del Progreso. They also argue
that the tax prompted depositors to withdraw their money from banks, thus undermining
the blanket guarantee’s goal of stabilizing bank liabilities (EIU 2004; Jácome H. 2004). In

negatively affected banks’ liquidity and portfolio structure and caused the technical bankruptcy of the CFN (IMF
2000b).
7 See Alvaro and Tedesco 1999; Dow Jones 1999a; IMF 2000a (28); Jácome H. 2004 (22); Republic of Ecuador
2000b (27, 59).
8 The Constitutional Tribunal was the highest court in Ecuador at the time and had final authority on
constitutional interpretation (Dow Jones 2007).
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October 1999, Ecuador had collected ECS 509.9 billion (USD 3 million)9 in revenue from the
financial transactions tax, according to the Ministry of Finance (Alvaro 1999b).
On November 5, 1999, the Ecuadorian Congress approved a tax reform bill that would lower
the 1% financial transaction tax to 0.8% on January 1, 2000. The bill also reestablished a
personal income tax on individuals who made at least ECS 80 million (USD 4,776) per year;
rates ran from 5% to 25%. This tax reform provided the basis for the government’s annual
budget for 2000. It was also a key condition for the IMF loan in 2000, according to then–
Economy Minister Javier Espinosa and then–IMF First Deputy Managing Director Stanley
Fisher (Alvaro 1999a; Fischer 2000).
The November 1999 tax reform did not inspire confidence among creditors, given the
reform’s narrow tax base, then–President Jamil Mahuad’s fragile coalition, and the lack of
information provided by the government (Remond 1999).
Dollarization
On January 9, 2000, Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its official currency10 (Republic of
Ecuador 2000b). To this end, authorities pegged the sucre at ECS 25,000 to the US dollar,
withdrew the sucre from circulation, and replaced sucres with US dollars between April and
September 2000. By September 2000, this process was largely complete (EIU 2004). In a
bond prospectus dated August 23, 2000, the government stated that it expected dollarization
to lower inflation, eliminate exchange rate risk, reverse capital flight, and render the
economy more transparent to both Ecuadorians and foreign investors (Republic of Ecuador
2000b).
Dollarization limited the BCE’s ability to provide liquidity support to the banking system.
Therefore, the government began to develop a mechanism to recycle liquidity within the
banking system: the sale of US dollar-denominated bonds combined with repurchase
operations—together with a BCE liquidity support facility (Republic of Ecuador 2000a;
Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
3. Legal Authority: The Law for the Economic Transformation of Ecuador established
the AGD and authorized measures outlined in Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a
Package.
Previously, the 1992 Monetary Regime and State Bank Law allowed the central bank to use
its funds to provide limited deposit insurance in sucres when a bank closed (BCE n.d.; Jácome
H. 2004).
The Law for the Economic Transformation of Ecuador authorized the creation of the AGD on
December 1, 1998 (El Telégrafo 2014; Law for Economic Transformation 1998, art. 144).
The Law for Economic Transformation also allowed the AGD to resolve failing banks through
Per contemporaneous reporting by Reuters, USD 1 = ECS 16,775 on November 10, 1999 (Remond 1999).
The Ecuadorian Constitution forbade the outright elimination of the sucre, so the sucre remained as a
fractional currency (Republic of Ecuador 2000b, 29; The Economist 2004).
9

10
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purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions (Jácome H. 2004). The Law for Economic
Transformation also eliminated the income tax in December 1998, though it was later
reinstated (see Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a Package) (El Telégrafo 2014).
Congress passed another law in November 1999 that allowed the AGD to use public funds to
cover deposit guarantees for Banco de Prestamos (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
4. Administration: A general manager led the AGD’s day-to-day administration.
The AGD’s board of directors appointed a nonvoting member to be the general manager of
the AGD (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
At least once per month, the AGD board evaluated information provided by the
Superintendency of Banks and CBE on the financial system and on each institution to
determine preventive or corrective policies (Hidalgo Loffredo, Yturralde Farah, and Maluk
Salem 1999).
5. Governance: A board of directors governed the AGD.
A board of directors administered the AGD, headed by the superintendent of banks. The
board also included the minister of finance, a director from the BCE, and a delegate appointed
by the president. The board’s general manager was a nonvoting member appointed by the
board itself (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
6. Communication: Research did not uncover contemporaneous communication
from the government about the guarantee, but some critics argue that the
implementation of the bank holiday and deposit freeze signaled instability.
Research did not uncover contemporaneous announcements or characterizations of the
guarantee from the Ecuadorian government, including the Ministry of Finance and AGD.
Former BCE President Jácome argues that the bank holiday and deposit freeze signaled the
government’s inability to stabilize the financial system. In his view, these measures
promoted rather than prevented bank runs (Jácome H. 2004).
According to the IMF, the government achieved a temporary resurgence in public confidence
in the banking system when it announced the results of its bank audits and next steps11 on
July 30, 199912 (IMF 2000b).

See Key Design Decision No. 11, Process for Exercising Guarantee. Capital compliant “A” banks remained
under private control. Capital deficient “B” banks remained operational and underwent a restructuring process.
Negative net worth “C” banks were immediately taken over and resolved by the AGD (IMF 2000b; Republic of
Ecuador 2000b).
12 Confidence fell again in September 1999 when Ecuador defaulted on its Brady bonds (IMF 2000b). Additional
capital flight and further withdrawal of foreign credit renewed liquidity pressure (IMF 2000b).
11
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7. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The AGD received funding through bonds,
budgetary allocations, and resources recovered from sales of assets of impaired
banks.
In August 2000, the government estimated the minimum net fiscal cost of the guarantee to
be USD 2.7 billion (or 24% of 2000 GDP) in bond issues and cash transactions to pay out
guaranteed deposits (Republic of Ecuador 2000b). External arrears of trade credit lines of
intervened banks totaled USD 63 million in 1999 and USD 154 million in 2000 (IMF 2000a).
As provided by the Law for Economic Transformation, the AGD issued bonds to cover the
guarantee. Bonds issued on behalf of the AGD for bank recapitalization accrued a monthly
simple interest rate of either 12% per annum or the coupon interest rate—whichever was
higher from the effective date of issuance. By June 2000, the AGD had issued USD 1.4 billion
in bonds (IMF 2000b; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). In August 2000, the government stated
that it expected to issue an additional USD 811 million to pay out guaranteed deposits in
closed banks—part of which would be offset by asset recovery—and USD 300 million in
bonds to capitalize troubled banks in the coming year (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
Starting in March 2000, the AGD paid for the guarantee with budgetary allocations and
resources recovered from the sales of assets of impaired banks. In August 2000, the
government stated that it expected to transfer USD 155 million to the AGD to pay out cashguaranteed deposits in closed banks (IMF 2000b; Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
Though the AGD switched its funding source, it still had the legal ability to issue bonds
(Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
8. Eligible Institutions: The guarantee applied to all lenders and all financial
institutions.
The AGD guaranteed trade financings of all lenders until March 2000 (Republic of Ecuador
2000b).
The AGD guaranteed deposits of all financial institutions. Under the Financial Institutions
Law of 1994, financial institutions included banks, finance companies, savings and loan
cooperatives, leasing companies, credit card issuers, brokerage houses, and insurance
companies (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
9. Eligible Liabilities: The guarantee applied to trade financings of all lenders, and
there were some restrictions on deposits.
The guarantee was unlimited for trade financings of all lenders from December 1998 to
March 2000 (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
The guarantee applied to most deposits with certain restrictions (Republic of Ecuador
2000b).
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The guarantee did not cover deposits that were subject to any right of setoff (Republic of
Ecuador 2000b).
Language in the Law for Economic Transformation explicitly said that the guarantee would
not cover deposits in offshore entities (Law for Economic Transformation 1998, art. 21).
However, a bond prospectus dated August 23, 2000, stated that the AGD initially intended to
guarantee offshore deposits (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
10. Fees: Financial institutions paid monthly fees to the AGD.
Financial institutions paid fees to the AGD of 65 basis points per year of financial institutions’
average deposit balances, broken into monthly payments (Hidalgo Loffredo, Yturralde Farah,
and Maluk Salem 1999).
11. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The Banking Board referred nonviable
institutions to the AGD, which paid guarantees in cash.
In December 1999, the government signed a three-year restructuring agreement with
foreign creditors to restructure USD 63.4 million in trade lines (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
In a Letter of Intent to the IMF dated April 4, 2000, Ecuadorian officials stated that the
government was in talks with foreign banks to restructure trade credit lines via the AGD with
Brady and euro bonds (Republic of Ecuador 2000). Research did not uncover whether this
arrangement actually happened.
Before the bank holiday, deposit freeze, and dollarization, the AGD honored deposit
guarantees with cash payments rather than government bonds, as mandated by the state
lawyer (Jácome H. 2004; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). After dollarization, the AGD also
honored the guarantee with bonds (LatinFinance 2002).
The government hired four international auditing firms to help determine viable and
nonviable banks (IMF 2000b; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). The Banking Board13 and board
of each bank received these results in June 1999 (Republic of Ecuador 2000b). Based on
these results, banks were sorted into three categories: capital compliant (“A”), capital
deficient (“B”), and negative net worth (“C”). On July 30, 1999, the government publicly
announced the results of this audit and next steps: “A” banks remained under private control;
“B” banks remained operational and underwent a restructuring process; the AGD
immediately took over and resolved “C” banks (IMF 2000b; Republic of Ecuador 2000b). For
financial institutions that closed (that is, “C” banks), the AGD sold or transferred the
institution’s assets and liabilities, recapitalized the institution, or paid the guaranteed
deposits in cash (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).

The superintendent of banks and Banking Board led the Superintendency of Banks (Republic of Ecuador
2000b). The Banking Board had five members: the superintendent of banks, the general manager of the BCE,
two members appointed by the Monetary Board, and one member appointed by the four other members
(Hidalgo Loffredo, Yturralde Farah, and Maluk Salem 1999; Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
13
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As provided by the Law for Economic Transformation, the AGD capitalized and managed
impaired banks through purchase and assumption transactions. P&A occurred when a
solvent bank purchased and assumed a proportion of an impaired bank’s assets and
liabilities. If assumed liabilities exceeded the purchased assets, the AGD provided the
difference in the form of liquid assets to the purchasing bank (Jácome H. 2004).
12. Other Restrictions: The guarantee applied only to deposits with certain interest
rates.
The guarantee applied only to deposits with certain interest rates. Until March 2000, the
guarantee covered only deposits with interest rates no more than 3% above the average
interest rate applied to deposits by banks. The president of Ecuador set the guaranteed
maximum deposit interest rate after March 2000, according to the Law for Economic
Transformation (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
13. Duration: The guarantee on trade lines ended as of March 2000; the AGD phased
out account guarantee coverage from 2001 to 2004.
Research did not uncover contemporaneous announcements about the guarantee’s duration,
so it is unclear how far in advance duration was predetermined and announced.
The AGD guaranteed trade financing for all lenders from December 1998 to the beginning of
March 2000 (Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
In a bond prospectus, dated August 2000, the government disclosed its intention to reduce
coverage of deposits in phases, starting in March 2001 (see Figure 3) (Republic of Ecuador
2000; Republic of Ecuador 2000b).
Figure 3: Timeline of Deposit Insurance Transition to USD 8,000
Timeframe
December 1998–March 2001

Coverage
Unlimited guarantee for all deposits

March 2001–March 2003

Guarantee up to 50% of total deposits for each
depositor up to USD 8,000

March 2003–March 2004

Guarantee up to 25% of total deposits for each
depositor up to USD 8,000

March 2004–December 2009

Guarantee up to USD 8,000 for each depositor

Source: El Comercio 2009; Jácome H. 2004; Republic of Ecuador 2000b.

On December 10, 2008, the Ecuadorian Transitional Congress passed the Law of Financial
Security, which outlined the replacement of the AGD by a new body: COSEDE. The law gave
a 12-month transition period plus a potential six-month grace period after the AGD’s closure
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(EIU 2009; Global Insight Daily Analysis 2008). The AGD transferred USD 133 million to
COSEDE’s new Deposit Insurance Fund in January 2009. Today, the COSEDE manages
deposit insurance in Ecuador and covers up to USD 31,000 per depositor (COSEDE 2013;
COSEDE n.d.; COSEDE Law n.d.).
For a comprehensive timeline of coverage and duration, see Appendix.
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Appendix
Figure 4: Timeline of Events and Interventions
Date

Details

April 1998

Deposit runs were triggered by the closure of Solbanco.

Fall 1998

Exogenous shocks prompted a reduction in external credit lines to
Ecuador.

December 1998

The government announced the creation of the AGD to guarantee
trade lines and deposits.
Financial transaction tax prompted depositors to withdraw from
banks, as people sought to make transactions outside the banking
system (see Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a Package).

March 8, 1999

The bank superintendent declared a surprise bank holiday. The
holiday lasted from March 8 to March 12, 1999.

March 11, 1999

Announcement of deposit freeze triggered runs estimated at ECS 1.7
billion.

April 1999

Deposit withdrawals continued despite the blanket guarantee after a
partial lifting of the freeze (see Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a
Package).

September 30, 1999

Ecuador’s default on its Brady bonds renewed credit withdrawals (see
Overview).

October 1999

Two large banks failed, triggering more deposit runs.

January 9, 2000

Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its official currency.

March 2000

Trade line guarantee ended as of March 2000.

March 2001

The AGD began to phase out blanket deposit coverage.

March 2004

The AGD completed the transition to a limited deposit insurance
scheme.

December 31, 2009

The AGD closed.

Note: The runs described above were not discrete incidences but rather a continuous problem that Ecuador
faced. This timeline provides some benchmark dates and events to conceptualize the evolution of the crisis.
Sources: Alvaro and Tedesco 1999; AP 1999; El Comercio 2009; El Telégrafo 2014; IMF 2000a, 28; IMF 2000b, 32;
Jácome H. 2004, 17, 19–20, 23, 29–30, 35; Republic of Ecuador 2000b, 2, 15, 56, 59; WSJ 1999.
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